Mariani, FabioGraziani, RiccardoRiccardoGraziani2025-05-142025-05-142025-05-142022https://hdl.handle.net/2078.2/27383I set up a model of conflict in which two groups that reside in the same homeland contest a public resource. Both groups maximise their utility functions with respect to the allocation of agents between violent conflict and productive activities. Given the characteristics of the conflict equilibrium, the two groups may prefer to divide the contested resource according to a sharing rule or fight each other. In this context, only one group is characterised by internal socio-cultural norms that affect members’ decisions. I find that a higher level of socio-cultural norm constraints increases the potential ethnic-group members participation in the conflict, and above a certain degree, it contributes to the upsurge of violence.ethnic conflictssocial normstext::thesis::master thesisthesis:33674