How does the use of Putnam's Two Level Game theory helps us understand and give a better picture of the 2015 Comfort Women Agreement between South Korea and Japan ?

Atanassova, ElenaBruyelle, SixtineSixtineBruyelle2025-05-142025-05-142025-05-142021https://hdl.handle.net/2078.2/25130This thesis will focus on studying the 2015 Comfort Women Agreement that was made between the South Korean and Japanese government. The objective is to discover more information about it and what went wrong with it by analysing it with the Two-Level Game Analysis of Robert Putnam. The results were that this 2015 Agreement completely omitted the opinion of the victims, of the public and of the political opposition in the negotiation process, which created monumental backlashes in the national scene. These backlashes also had a very negative impact on the relationship between the two countries. Another impact of theirs was that they revealed that the 2015 Agreement was perceived as an agreement that did not respect the element of procedural, retributive, and restorative justice. This thesis exposes the fact that, on the matter of historical disputes, especially when there were historical victims such as the comfort women, the decision making for an agreement on these kinds of issues need to be transparent and involve the victim as well.Historical DisputesComfort Women2015 Comfort Women AgreementSouth KoreaJapanTwo-Level Game.How does the use of Putnam's Two Level Game theory helps us understand and give a better picture of the 2015 Comfort Women Agreement between South Korea and Japan ?text::thesis::master thesisthesis:32484