To what extent can the European Commission still make use of international negotiations to influence the CAP's reform process? An analysis of the EU-MERCOSUR negotiations

Details

Supervisors

Delreux, Tom

Faculty

Faculté des sciences économiques, sociales, politiques et de communication

Degree label

Master [120] en études européennes, à finalité spécialisée: gouvernance et sociétés européennes

Abstract

The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) is one of the European Union’s oldest and most debated policy. Since its creation, the CAP has been the subject of heavy criticisms based on three main axioms: its budgetary and environmental costs and its trade-distortive impact. As a response to the attacks formulated within and beyond the Union, the CAP has been engaged in a continuous reform process over the past thirty years. One of the main drivers behind the policy’s reforms has undoubtedly been the European Commission and its successive Commissioners for agriculture. In order to have such an impact on the CAP over the years, the Commission extensively relied on the power it derives from being the sole negotiator on behalf of the EU during international trade talks. This paper attempts to establish the extent to which the Commission is still able to influence the CAP through its strategic use of international trade negotiations given the different situation in which the Commission finds itself today compared to the early 1990s. To do so, the analysis provided relies on several theoretical concepts used to outline the toolbox that the Commission has at its disposal in order to still be an important actor in the CAP’s reform process. Such concepts are then applied to the EU-MERCOSUR negotiations for an Association Agreement and seem to highlight how the Commission’s influence over the Common Agricultural Policy has faded away over the last three decades.