Winner-takes-all in digital platform markets: how the peculiarities of these markets affect the competition game

Details

Supervisors

de Ghellinck, Elisabeth ; Paolo Garella

Faculty

Faculté des sciences économiques, sociales, politiques et de communication

Degree label

Master [120] en sciences économiques, orientation générale

Abstract

The entry of digital platforms into the competition game seems to have caused an irreversible change in the dynamics between companies; in fact, they represent a point of convergence for both firms and consumers; as a result, the previous situation characterized by many actors dispersed in the market, struggling to meet those with whom they wish to transact, seems now less fragmented. Given this transformation of the competitive landscape, the following research questions arise: to what extent do digital platforms change the nature of competition? And to what extent is it necessary to adapt competition policy to the specific features of digital platform markets? These platforms, in fact, are characterized by peculiar characteristics preventing them from being analysed in the traditional framework. Are such peculiarities conducive to a situation dominated by a winner-takes-all? In order to try to answer these questions, I use a variety of sources given the complex nature of digital companies. As for the structure of my thesis, I start by presenting the main characteristics of platform markets; then, I shift my attention to digital platform markets. After presenting the theory, I apply it by presenting a case study concerning Amazon.com. My study indicates that digital platform markets are characterized by peculiarities deeply affecting the competition game; nonetheless, although the latter may be conducive to a situation of winner-takes-all, the existence of many alternative channels competitors can exploit, and the highly dynamic and innovative components of such markets seem to indicate that a winner-takes-all may be only temporary.