The U.S.-China Tension on Chip Supremacy and The Geopolitical Role of The European Union in Semiconductor Supply Chain
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- This thesis investigates Europe’s position in the global semiconductor value chain and its broader implications for digital sovereignty amid intensifying geopolitical competition. Historically, Europe failed to establish a self-sufficient computing and semiconductor ecosystem, as illustrated by the collapse of the UNIDATA initiative in the 1970s. This early weakness contrasts with the state-led industrial strategies of East Asia, where the “Asian Tigers” —Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, successfully embedded themselves in global semiconductor production networks. Today, Europe remains largely on the consumption side of the digital economy, heavily dependent on U.S. technology firms for cloud services, platforms, and innovation, while lacking comparable production capacity or strategic autonomy. Recent initiatives such as the European Chips Act represent an attempt to reverse this trajectory, yet they raise fundamental questions about whether Europe is capable of closing the technological gap or risks entrenching a junior-partner role in a U.S.-led order. Drawing on insights from political economy, the study situates Europe’s struggle within broader debates on strategic autonomy, neoliberal integration, and the “levelling” of global power between regions. It argues that while Europe cannot easily replicate the developmental models of the United States or East Asia, it may nonetheless chart a distinct path shaped by its social market economy, democratic institutions, and regulatory power. The findings contribute to understanding Europe’s constrained yet significant role in the global semiconductor industry and highlight the broader stakes for its digital sovereignty in an emerging multipolar order.