Parti présidentiel et performances macroéconomiques aux États-Unis : analyse empirique de 1949 à 2024

Details

Supervisors

Bodart, Vincent

Faculty

Faculté des sciences économiques, sociales, politiques et de communication

Degree label

Master [120] en sciences économiques, orientation générale, à finalité spécialisée

Abstract

enThis thesis examines differences in macroeconomic performance in the United States according to the president’s political party between 1949 and 2024. Using primarily quarterly data, it updates estimates of the growth gap between Democratic and Republican administrations and assesses its sensitivity to inherited economic conditions, the timing convention used to assign presidential responsibility, the composition of Congress, and oil and productivity shocks. It also investigates two mechanisms that could potentially explain this gap: fiscal policy and changes in expectations around elections. The results confirm the existence of a descriptive gap in favour of Democratic administrations. Annualized quarterly real GDP growth is, on average, 1.18 percentage points higher under Democratic presidents. This differential is mainly driven by the private components of aggregate demand, particularly private fixed investment, and is accompanied by a lower incidence of recessions and stronger employment growth. However, it is concentrated in the first two years of presidential terms and is sensitive to the convention used to attribute economic performance to presidents. Observable pre-election conditions provide no evidence that Democrats systematically inherit a more favourable economic environment, while accounting for oil shocks reduces part of the gap without eliminating it. The analysis of a quarterly measure of fiscal impulse, narrative tax shocks, and confidence indicators does not provide a substantial explanation for this differential. Democratic victories are followed by more favourable developments in consumer confidence, but this pattern is less apparent for business sentiment and does not account for the observed growth advantage. Overall, the partisan gap therefore remains largely unexplained and should be interpreted as a descriptive association rather than as the causal effect of superior economic management by either party.