European revolving door lobbyists, what's the added value of a work experience as an EU official on the Brussels lobbying market?

Details

Supervisors

Aldashev, Gani

Faculty

Faculté des sciences économiques, sociales, politiques et de communication

Degree label

Master [120] en sciences économiques, orientation générale

Abstract

This thesis will explore the link between lobbying revenue, lobbying effectiveness and lobbyists’ work experience in the public sector. The hypothesis of the importance of the netwotk and relations is used to explain the success of revolving door lobbyists in the European Union. Two databases were crossed to obtain one final sample, the Revolving Door Watch database by Corporate Europe Observatory and the Transparency Register. In the end, the presence of a person issuing from the public sector increase the average wage in a lobbying organisation by 103,8%. A lobbying firm with clients associated with a revolving door case is expected to see its income increased by 82,1%. The presence of a former EU officials in a lobbying firm also have a small impact of the benefits of the firm, +69,7%. And finally, being associated with a revolving door case for a lobbying organisation increase its presence in the European Parliament by an average of 5,577 extra persons.