Responsible for Our (Climate) Actions? - Climate Signaling in a Dictator Game with Heterogeneous Preferences

Details

Supervisors

Panin, Amma

Faculty

Faculté des sciences économiques, sociales, politiques et de communication

Degree label

Master [120] en sciences économiques, orientation économétrie, à finalité approfondie

Abstract

What influences climate-friendly behavior? For this study, I focus on the idea of climate signaling and the role it plays for decisions regarding climate action. Previous investigations have been made surrounding the effect of visibility on socially-conscious actions. I adapt these frameworks to observe behavior with respect to climate action in a dictator game, in both public and private settings. Results show that climate signaling positively affects average donation amounts. However, the main driver behind pro-climate behavior remains to be an intrinsic value for climate action. A simple model of an individuals’ climate-behavior propensity is then used to estimate values for moral and conventional responsibility with the results of our survey.