Between Autonomy and Control: Comparative Legal Study on the Independence and Impartiality of National Competition Authorities in France and Poland under EU Law
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- This research provides a comparative legal analysis of the independence and impartiality of National Competition Authorities (NCAs) in France and Poland considering Directive (EU) 2019/1 (the ‘ECN+ Directive’). As key instruments of public enforcement under EU competition law, NCAs must operate independently of political or private influence and ensure impartiality when applying Articles 101 and 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The ECN+ Directive, adopted in 2018, aims to harmonize minimum standards for institutional independence, resources, and enforcement powers across Member States. The objective of this study is to examine how two contrasting legal systems—France, a founding Member State with a long-standing legal administrative tradition, and Poland, a more recent EU Member State—have transposed and implemented the ECN+ Directive, which aims to reinforce the independence and impartiality of NCAs. The study focuses on their institutional frameworks, appointment procedures, decision-making structures, and susceptibility to political interference. Methodologically, the research adopts a mixed dogmatic-functional comparative approach, drawing on primary legal sources by using EU treaties, directives, national legislation, case law from national courts and the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), and academic literature. The analysis is structured in three parts : (i) a descriptive overview of the relevant legal concepts and systems; (ii) a comparative analysis identifying structural variations; and (iii) a critical policy evaluation offering reform-oriented recommendations. Findings show that both France and Poland have formally complied with the ECN+ Directive but through divergent institutional paths. France maintains a collegial decision-making structure within the Autorité de la concurrence, enhancing internal accountability mechanisms. However, the political nature of appointments and the possibility for individual decisions by the NCA’s president raise concerns over impartiality and perceived independence. Poland, by contrast, has introduced a merit-based recruitment system and strengthened statutory guarantees of independence, but it is in the hands of UOKiK President, who retains highly centralized decision-making authority, with no collegial oversight body. These differences stem from contrasting legal and administrative cultures—France’s technocratic deliberation versus Poland’s hierarchical adaptation shaped by Europeanisation. The study concludes that institutional independence goes beyond legal formalities; it constitutes a multidimensional condition requiring structural, cultural, and operational safeguards. This research contributes to EU competition governance scholarship by assessing the practical implementation of the ECN+ Directive and proposing targeted reforms: transparent, merit-based appointments in France and the creation of a collegial review body in Poland, both aimed at strengthening public confidence in the impartiality of NCAs.